The agony is over. The end has come in the noted Bennett murder case. Defendant is once more a free woman. The jury went out at ten minutes past 9 this morning, and at 2:30 this afternoon returned a verdict of not guilty. Quite a crowd of spectators were present when the result was announced, and a clapping of hands that could be heard a block distant greeted the declaration. Intense but subdued anxiety and even excitement was depicted upon every face present, with but a single exception. That exception was the defendant herself. The same remarkable nerve the same calm exterior, the same wonderful self control were manifest to the end. Being told soon after the verdict was rendered that she was the coolest person in the court room she quietly remarked: “Why shouldn’t I be?” Spectators, attorneys and the court crowded around Mrs. Bennett and extended hearty congratulations. Judge Weaver thanked the jury for their patience and promptness, discharged them for the term and declared court adjourned sine die.

The jury cast but four ballots. The first stood six for acquittal and six for conviction, the second, seven for acquittal, five for conviction, the third, eleven for acquittal and one for conviction, and the fourth and last, all for acquittal.

Judge Weaver delivered his charge to the jury in the Bennett case immediately upon the convening of court this morning. The instructions are more extended in scope and character than those delivered by Judge Hindman in the former trial. They embrace thirty-five paragraphs, covering all the primary or potential points in the case. They are comprehensive yet concise, explicit and remarkably clear. There is no unnecessary verbiage or lawful phraseology. The law applying to a case of this kind, and the instructions relative to a people and part consideration of evidence of the character introduced in this trial are succinctly and plainly set forth, and it is not probable that the jury will have to call upon the court to more fully define or explain any part of the charge as delivered. Accompanying the instructions were blank forms for five different verdicts, namely, murder in the first degree, with penalty death; murder in the first degree with the punishment life imprisonment; murder in the second degree; manslaughter – the court to fix the punishment in either of the latter; and not guilty. Judge Weaver finished reading his charge to the jury and they were sent out at 9:10 this morning.

A synopsis of the instructions covering all essential points follows:

The defendant having been indicted for the murder of Anna Wiese, and having entered a plea of not guilty to the charge, the burden is placed upon the state to establish every material averment by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. A charge of murder as made in this case includes murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree and manslaughter – and if the evidence justifies a verdict of guilty it may be for either of the grades of offense so enumerated. Murder in the first degree is the willful, premeditated killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Murder in the second degree differs from the first degree in that it lacks the elements of premeditation and the specific intent to take life. Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice – such a killing as takes place in the heat of a sudden quarrel.

A reasonable doubt is one which naturally and fairly arises in the mind of the juror upon a full and impartial consideration of the entire case. Absolute certainty is not required and is rarely ever possible. On the other hand, it is not sufficient for the state to establish a probability of guilt, or to show circumstances raising a suspicion of guilt; but the evidence must so satisfy the judgment and conscience as to exclude every other rational conclusion.

If then you find that a series of facts has been established which are all consistent with the theory of defendant’s guilt and wholly inconsistent with any rational theory of her innocence, and you are thereby convinced of the truth of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, it will by your duty to convict. On the other hand, if such facts and circumstances, however suspicious they may be, are explainable or any reasonable theory of her innocence, then her guilt has been sufficiently established, and you should acquit her. In the absence of any proof to the contrary, her words and acts are presumed to be innocent, and should be given their natural and ordinary interpretations, from evidence should be matters of deliberate and impartial reasoning, and not of mere feeling or prejudice.

If then, from all the evidence thus impartially considered, you find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did assault and kill Anna Wiese, as charged in the indictment, you should return a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree, or murder in the second degree, or manslaughter, as you may find the case to be. If guilty the verdict should be for the highest degree established beyond a reasonable doubt, but if you find her guilty and have any reasonable doubt as to the degree, you should convict of the lower degree only. If, however, you have a reasonable doubt whether she has been found guilty of any crime, you should acquit her entirely.

Where it is clearly shown by direct evidence that one person has slain another with malice express or implied, the slayer’s motive for the crime is immaterial, but where the commission of the crime or the connection of the accused therewith depends entirely upon circumstantial evidence, the question of motive or absence of motive is one of great importance, not as an element of the crime, but as one of the circumstances which may assist the jury to find whether the accused committed it.

Testimony of witness as to alleged conversations with defendant are to be scrutinized by the jury with caution, taking into consideration the infirmity of the human memory, the circumstances under which words were spoken, whether they were correctly understood and are now correctly repeated and then give them such weight and consideration as you believe them fairly entitled to.

Testimony as to the apparent nervousness and anxiety of a person as evidence of guilt is ordinarily of little value, but is proper to be considered, taking care to inquire whether any exhibition of that kind, if proved, was of a character indicating a consciousness of guilt, or is nothing more than the natural trepidation or emotion which an innocent person might manifest under like circumstances.

Expert witnesses have testified concerning certain hair and alleged blood stains. These witnesses, it must be remembered, do not claim to know any of the facts surrounding the murder, but speak only as to their opinions concerning the subjects just mentioned. From the limitations which circumscribe human judgment and human skill expert testimony can rarely be conclusive. Conditions are so variable that expert opinion upon any given subject, through reflecting the best thought and highest professional skill, may yet be wrong as applied to a particular instance under inquiry. The chief value of this evidence is to enable you the more intelligently to examine and apply the evidence of the facts otherwise developed and thereby reach a conclusion of your own.

You should give careful consideration to the arguments of counsel so far as they are fairly based upon or drawn from the evidence, but statements of fact made by them not shown in the testimony nor fairly to be inferred from such testimony you should wholly reject from your deliberations.

You should allow no real or supposed popular demand for a conviction or acquittal to influence your verdict in the least.

Insinuations made during the trial or in argument that counsel upon either side have wrongfully or fraudulently disturbed or destroyed the identity of any of the exhibits in evidence are without any foundation in the testimony, and you will give them no weight in considering the case.

You are the judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the value of their testimony. This, however, should not be passed upon arbitrarily, but in the exercise of that care and judgment which become honest and intelligent men engaged in a natural investigation for the discovery of truth.

The law of this state makes it the duty of a jury returning a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree to assess the punishment to be inflicted at death or imprisonment for life, as the jury may determine. Should you find the defendant guilty of that crime, you will assess the punishment accordingly.

Finally, gentlemen, you will give the case your impartial, patient and conscientious consideration, and then, without fear or favor, passion or prejudice, return with a verdict as under all the evidence and the law of these instructions and your solemn oaths as jurors you believe to be right and just.

BURIAL PLACE OF ANNA WIESE

HELP US SOLVE THIS MURDER

THE NIGHT WATCHMAN HOMEPAGE