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The Murder of Anna Wiese | ||
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EVENING TIMES REPUBLICAN |
FRIDAY, APRIL 20, 1894 | |
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HEADLINES APRIL 20, 1894 END OF THE BENNETT CASE At the time this page of the TIMES-REPUBLICAN goes to press the jury in the Bennett-Wiese case is still out. There are no indications of an agreement. Like many another case in circumstantial evidence the proofs affect different minds differently. One person is positive that Mrs. Bennett is guilty while another of equal intelligence and fairness after listening to the same evidence declares her innocent while a third thinks the matter doubtful. Whether certain stains were blood marks, whether hair found in the dead girl's hand was from the head of the accused woman, whether fibers under Anna's finger nails came from Mrs. Bennett's head, whether suspicions of unchastity developed into vengeful motive - as to these and like matters there is hopeless disagreement among outsiders and probably will be among jurors. The jury is one of unusual intelligence and fairness but at this hour a disagreement seems inevitable. Later news will be found on the inside pages of this issue. FRIDAY, APRIL 21, 1894 Continued with the Following Headlines: JUDGE TO JURY Full Text of the Court's Instructions In the Wiese Murder Case They Are Comprehensive Yet Concise, and Very Explicit on Motive Different Degrees for Which the jury May Find and the Penalty In the District Court, of Marshall County, Iowa, March Term, A. D., 1894. The State of Iowa Against Emily Bennett. Charge of the Court. I. The defendant, Emily Bennett, is accused of the crime of murder, alleged and charged in the indictment to have been committed as follows: The said Emily Bennett, on the 26th day of August, A. D., 1893, in the county of Marshall, and state of Iowa, with malice aforethought, deliberately, premeditatedly and with intent to kill and murder one Anna Wiese, a human being then under the peace of said state, did unlawfully and feloniously assault, cut and stab on the breast and body of the said Anna Wiese and did cut the throat of said Anna Wiese with a knife, the same being a a deadly weapon, and did beat, pound, strike and bruise said Anna Wiese upon the head and body with a large club of wood, the same being a deadly weapon, and did inflict upon said Anna Wiese other mortal injuries by other deadly weapons to the jury unknown, and by reason of said cuts, stabs, wounds and injuries so inflicted, the said Anna Wiese was then and there, killed and murdered by said Emily Bennett, and she, the said Anna Wiese, by reason thereof, then and there died, and the grand jury of the county aforesaid, do accuse the said Emily Bennett of the felonious killing of Anna Wiese, as aforesaid, contrary to law and against the peace and dignity of the state of Iowa. To this accusation and indictment the defendant has entered a plea of not guilty. II. Under the issues joined in this action, the burden is upon the state to establish by the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, every material allegation of the indictment, namely: 1. That the defendant did, at some time before the finding of this indictment, unlawfully assault said Anna Wiese. 2. That said assault was made in Marshall county, Iowa. 3. That said assault was maliciously made, with intent to kill and murder said Anna Wiese. 4. That the said Anna Wiese died of the wounds then and there inflicted by the defendant in making said assault; and, 5. That the assault was made with malice aforethought, either express or implied. III. Under the law in this state, a person charged with a crime may, if the evidence warrant a conviction at all, be found, according to the facts, guilty either of the offense as charged in the indictment, or of any lower degree of crime necessarily included in the indictment; and, in this case, if you find from the evidence, viewed in the light of the law as given you in these instructions, that the defendant is guilty of a crime of which she can be convicted under this indictment, you must then determine of what degree of the crime she is guilty, namely: 1. Murder of the first degree; or, 2. Murder of the second degree; or, 3. Manslaughter IV. Whoever kills any human being with malice aforethought either expressed or implied, is guilty of murder. Express malice aforethought is a mental conception of a purpose or design to kill, formed at some time before the deadly act. Implied malice aforethought is when the killing is done by using a dangerous or deadly weapon, missile or instrument in such a manner as would naturally and necessarily result in death, but without specific intent to kill. The law does not authorize any distinction between express and implied malice in determining the degree of the offense or the punishment, for the using of a dangerous or deadly weapon, missile, instrument or implement in such a manner as would naturally and necessarily produce death is regarded by the law as equivalent to a willful design to kill. Murder perpetrated by means of poison or lying in wait or any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which is committed in the perpetration of or an attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, mayhem or burglary is of the first degree, and murder committed otherwise than as above defined is of the second degree. Willful, deliberate and premeditated murder implies an unlawful killing with the intention to kill, after such lapse of time of the conception of the intention to kill was formed as afforded opportunity to deliberate upon the purpose formed, and to reflect, premeditate and reason upon the intended act and its consequences. If there was time for such reflection, to reason, to deliberate, to premeditate, the willfullness, deliberation, premeditation may be presumed from the lapse of time. V. Murder of the second degree is the unlawful killing of a human being intentionally, or by using a dangerous or deadly weapon or implement in such a way as would naturally and necessarily produce death when the intention to kill or use the deadly weapon was formed before the assault, in the heat of passion or under provocation or excitement, not sufficient to excuse or justify the assault, but without sufficient time between the conception of the design or purpose to kill; and the assault, to allow the blood to cool, or give opportunity to deliberate, premeditate and reflect upon the crime and its consequences. VI. Manslaughter is the unlawful and felonious killing of any human being without any malice, either express or implied. VII. A reasonable doubt is one that is actual, substantial, rational; not forced or fanciful; must not be sought for, but fairly and naturally arise in the mind upon a full and fair consideration of all the material facts and circumstances proved in the case, and all the fair and reasonable inferences, from such facts and circumstances, which are warranted by the common experience and observation of mankind. If, upon such consideration, your judgment wavers, and does not settle down upon an abiding and satisfactory conclusion, to a moral and legal certainty of the guilt of the accused, such a conclusion as you would act upon is a matter of the highest interest to yourselves, then the doubt is reasonable, and you should acquit; but if, after a full, careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in this case, you can say and feel that you have an abiding conviction of the guilt of the defendant of the crime charged against her in the indictment, and are fully satisfied of the truth of the charge herein made against her, then you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt. VIII. Intent is a mental condition and difficult to prove by direct evidence. It is usually inferred from the nature and character of the act to which it is related, or from the manner in which or the circumstances under which the act was done. But in law every person is presumed to intend that which is the natural and necessary result of her voluntary act. If one person meet or intercept another and assault her with a club or knife with such violence, and inflicts such stabs, cuts and wounds upon the person of the assailed in such a manner, or under such circumstances, as would naturally and necessarily result in the death of the person assailed, and she is killed thereby, the law authorizes the presumption that the assailant intended to kill, and the killing in such case is criminal or not according to the facts of the case. IX. The testimony introduced on the part of the state in this case is what is known in law as circumstantial evidence; and, you are instructed that circumstantial evidence, in criminal cases, is the proof of such facts and circumstances connected with, or surrounding the alleged commission of the crime charged, as tends to show the guilt or innocence of the party charged; and, if all the facts and circumstances produced in evidence in this case are sufficient to satisfy your judgment and conscience of the guilt of the defendant of the crime, or any degree of the crime, charged against her in the indictment, beyond a reasonable doubt, then such evidence is sufficient to authorize you in finding a verdict of guilty. But if, upon the consideration of all the evidence introduced in this case, you have a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant of the crime charged against her in the indictment, it is your duty to acquit the defendant and return a verdict of not guilty. X. You are further instructed that you may from circumstantial evidence alone, find the defendant guilty when the facts established are inconsistent with any other view than that of her guilt. But in order to find the defendant guilty upon circumstantial evidence alone, the facts must be wholly inconsistent with the innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation upon any other reasonable hypothesis than that of her guilt. XI. You are instructed that it is the law of the state that the distinction between an accessory before the fact and a principal in abrogated; and all persons concerned in the commission of a public offense, whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet its commission, though not present, must be indicted; tried and punished as principals. You are further instructed that an accessory is one who stands by and aids, abets or assists, or who, not being present, aiding, abetting or assisting, hath advised, encouraged, aided or abetted the perpetration of the crime charged. She who thus aids, abets, assists, advises or encourages is considered a principal and punished accordingly. And in this case, if you find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant aided and abetted any other person (as above defined) in the murder of the said Anna Wiese, then and in such case the defendant would be just as guilty as though she alone had committed the charged offense. XII. You are instructed that while the statute of this state provides that a person charged with a crime may testify in her own behalf, she is under no obligation to do so; and the statute expressly declares that "should a defendant not elect to become a witness that fact shall not have any weight against her on the trial," nor create any presumption against her. And in deliberating upon your verdict in this case, you must not let the fact that the defendant has not testified have any weight, influence, force or effect whatsoever. The law requires you, as jurors, to decide this case with reference alone to the testimony that has actually been introduced in this case, and without reference to what might, or might not, have been proved if other witnesses had testified. XIII. One of the defense interposed by the defendant in this case is what is known in law as an alibi; that is, that the defendant was at another place at the time of the alleged commission of the crime charged in the indictment. The burden of proof is upon the state to establish by the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the said Anna Wiese was murdered at the time and place charged in the indictment. But, if the state has made this proof, then the burden of proof is on the defendant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence her defense of alibi; but, if the entire evidence upon the whole case, raises reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt, then you should acquit her. By a preponderance of evidence is meant the greater weight or value of the evidence, and not necessarily the greater number of witnesses who may have testified to any alleged fact or to say alleged state of facts. XIV. You will observe that during the trial of this case much has been said by the attorneys, both for the state and the defendant, concerning the motive, if any, or want of motive, on the part of the defendant, for the alleged commission of the crime charged against her in the indictment. In criminal law motive is defined as an inducement; or, that which leads or tempts the mind to indulge the criminal act. It is an auxiliary fact from which, when established in connection with other necessary facts, the main or primary fact of guilt may be inferred, and it may be established by circumstantial evidence, the same as any other fact; and in all cases depending on circumstantial evidence, an inquiry into the motives actuating the accused is always important, because human experience shows that persons do not commit crime with out a motive therefore. And it is your duty as jurors, to carefully, impartially and fully consider all the facts and circumstances disclosed by the testimony bearing on that question, if any, in arriving at your verdict, and then give it such weight, and only such weight, as you shall deem it justly and fairly entitled to, in determining whether the defendant is guilty, or not guilty, of the crime charged against her in this case. |
XV. The word malice, as used in the indictment in this case, in charging the crime of murder against the defendant, imports a criminal motive, intent or purpose; and a malicious act is a wrongful act intentionally done, without legal justification or excuse. It is not often that express malice is direct-proved in the trial of a cause; its existence lies in the heart of the wrong doer, and he or she, alone, knows its secret. And the existence, or non-existence, of malice is an inference to be drawn by the jury, from all the facts and circumstances disclosed by the testimony. XVI. Several witnesses have testified as experts in this case; and, in law, in all questions involving scientific knowledge, special skill and training, the testimony of expert witnesses is admitted on those points. In this case it is deemed material to allow expert witnesses to testify as to whether or not a claimed stain on the waist of a dress that has been introduced in evidence was or was not blood; and, also, as to whether or not certain hairs alleged to have been found in the hand, and on the shoulder of the said Anna Wiese were, or were not, identical or similar to the hair of the defendant. Having heard this evidence, you will give it such weight as you shall deem it entitled to, but you are not bound to act upon such testimony to the exclusion of other evidence. XVII. Testimony has been introduced tending to show the relative weight, age, size, condition of health and strength of the defendant and the said Anna Wiese, as well as the actions, conduct and conversations of the defendant before and since the alleged murder of Anna Wiese, and they are proper matters for your consideration, in connection with all the other facts and circumstances disclosed by the testimony, when deliberating upon your verdict. XVIII. If you find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that, at the time and place charged in the indictment, the defendant made an unlawful assault upon the said Anna Wiese, and then and there, either inflicted, or aided and abetted in inflicting, upon the person of said Anna Wiese, wounds of which she died, you will see by the definition and rules hereinbefore given you, that the defendant must have been guilty of murder of either the first or second degree or of manslaughter. For if death results from an unlawful assault the offense can not be less than manslaughter. And if she made such assault, upon a prior formed intention to kill the said Anna Wiese, it was murder either of the first or second degree. XIX. If you shall find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant unlawfully either killed said Anna Wiese, or aided and abetted in killing her in a sudden passion or heat of blood, without deliberation and without malice, she is not guilty of murder either of the first or second degree, but in such case she is guilty of manslaughter, and you should so find by your verdict. XX. If you find the defendant is guilty of some degree or grade of the crime charged in the indictment, and yet that it is reasonably doubtful whether she is guilty of the highest degree, it will then be your duty to assign the offense to the highest degree of which there is no reasonable doubt. But, if you have a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant, it is your duty to acquit her. XXI. If you find the defendant guilty of murder of the first degree, it will then be your duty to say by your verdict whether the defendant shall be punished with death, or by imprisonment at hard labor in the penitentiary for life. If you find the defendant guilty of any degree below murder of the first degree you cannot consider the question of punishment, either in determining whether the defendant is guilty or not, or, if guilty of what degree of the crime she is guilty, that matter being left by the law to be fixed by the court. XXII. With these instructions, I hand you five forms of verdict. If you find the defendant guilty of murder of the first degree and fix her punishment at death, you will use the first form of verdict, and one of your number will sign it as foreman. If you find the defendant guilty of murder of the first degree, and fix her punishment at hard labor for life in the penitentiary, you will use the second form, and one of your number will sign it as foreman. If you find the defendant guilty of murder of the second degree you will use the third form and one of your number will sign it as foreman. If you find the defendant guilty of manslaughter, you will use the fourth form and one of your number will sign it as foreman. And if you find the defendant not guilty of either murder of the first or second degree or manslaughter, you will use the fifth form, and one of your number will sign it as foreman. XXIII. You are the judges of the credibility of the witnesses, and of the weight to be attached to the testimony of each and all of them; and you have the right to determine from all the facts and circumstances appearing on the trial, which witnesses are the more worthy of credit, and then give your credit accordingly. You are further instructed that evidence consists of all the material facts and circumstances proved in this case, and all the fair and reasonable inferences, from such facts and circumstances, which are warranted by the common experience and observation of mankind; and in determining the amount of credit you shall give to the various witnesses, you have the right to consider the conduct and appearance of each witness on the stand, the manner and matter of his or her testimony, and its consistency or inconsistency with itself, with other well proved facts, and with the circumstances surrounding the persons and transactions to which the testimony relates; the age and intelligence of the witness, and his or her interest, if any, in the result of the controversy; his or her relation to the parties interested, or the absence of such relation; the means and opportunities of the witness to know the matters he or she testifies to; the apparent correctness or reliability of the memory of the witness respecting the matters involved in his or her testimony; whether he or she has testified to any material matters untruthfully, and if so, whether such untruthfulness was willful or by inadvertence, or by mere failure to remember the facts; whether the witness has been contradicted by other creditable testimony; and whether and to what extent the witness is corroborated by other reliable evidence; and all the other matters and facts disclosed by the testimony in the case bearing on this question; and then give to each witness the credit, and his or her testimony the weight you deem them entitled to, or none if entitled to none as you shall believe to be the very right. XXIV. In conclusion, gentlemen, give this case your careful consideration; view the facts proved in the light of the law as given you in these instructions, and without prejudice, passion, partiality, fear or favor, return such a verdict as shall satisfy your judgment and conscience in just and in accord with truth. (Signed) D. R. Hindman, Judge FRIDAY, APRIL 20, 1894 Continued with the Following Headlines: JURY STILL OUT No Verdict Yet Reached In the Bennett-Wiese Murder Case The Public Anxiously Awaiting the Result - Torturing Suspense for Defendant Reports of Test Votes In the Jury Room, But Not Considered Voracious Little Prospect of An Agreement - Trial Devoid of Sensations AWAITING THE END The Suspense Becoming Painful, and to the Accused It is Torture The public is still anxiously awaiting the verdict of the jury in the Bennett-Wiese murder case. For considerably over twenty-four hours now the twelve men in whose hands rests the fate of Mrs. Bennett have been deliberating, as yet without result. It is a painful suspense. All eyes are turned toward the jury room with anxious, expectant glance. Every man has his own opinion as regards the guilt of the defendant, and all sorts of speculations are indulged in relative to the outcome. But while the citizens generally are awaiting the result with more than ordinary concern, a man and wife are at the Savory house, whose anxiety must be the climax of mental torture. Who shall ever know and who shall ever be able to describe the feelings that stir and rack the souls of Mr. and Mrs. Bennett? The husband is tortured with the dread and fear that at any hour his wife may be torn from his side and thrust into a criminal's cell, while she must contemplate such a fate with instructive and shrinking horror. The fact that no verdict has yet been reached renders the hope of acquittal almost vain. A disagreement means retrial, when the whole dreaded ordeal must be repeated. The uncertainty must make the heart sick almost unto death. Mrs. Bennett has exhibited the most remarkable nerve ever witnessed in an Iowa criminal court, but she is only human. It is learned that her composure in the court room deserts her in large measure when she is in private and not under restraint. She suffers intensely. She tosses sleeplessly on her bed at night and moans piteously. This thing is a terrible crisis in her life. It is wearing her out and when the end comes it is feared there will be utter collapse. This case has been peculiarly remarkable. Interest has not flagged since the day it began, and yet it has been a trial entirely devoid of sensational features. There has not been an extraordinary development nor a startling disclosure from beginning to end. No thrilling scenes marked the progress of the trial and there was no denouement to make the closing acts of the drama memorable. This made it a disappointing case. Everybody expected something different. People were there to witness strange scenes and revelations, but their patience was unrewarded. Mrs. Bennett's anxiety must have been augmented by the disappointment to which she was subjected yesterday. It is said that when the jury was sent out her counsel advised her to go down in Mr. Caswell's office and there await the verdict, as it would certainly be returned in a very short time and would be in her favor. That hope perished when the jury went to supper on time and evidently prepared to make a night of it. Any authentic or reliable information from the jury room is of course next to impossible to obtain. A rumor was circulated early this morning that on first ballot the jury stood 9 to 3 for acquittal. A subsequent report, and apparently more trustworthy, was to the effect that on a later ballot the vote was 7 to 5 for acquittal. Some are of the opinion that if a verdict is reached at all it will be for manslaughter, but the consensus of sentiment now is that the jury will disagree. MR. CARNEY'S PERORATION Last Words of Counsel for the State to the Bennett Jury The hurried report of yesterday scarcely did justice to Mr. Carney in closing his masterly argument for the state in the Bennett murder case. His peroration will bear repeating, and was as follows: Now, gentlemen, my task is done; I have reached the end of this case; we have, at last, come to the parting of our ways; you go to your jury room to determine upon this great question, a question of momentous consequence, not only to Mrs. Bennett, but to a large number of other persons, much more than pertains to the usual crime. Counsel for the defendant have said that a cloud hangs over the people there, and that is true; I trust your efforts will be to dispel that cloud; I trust that the result of your deliberations will be of such a character that you may be able to find the guilty party. I know that you are brave enough, all of you, to do it if you believe it to be true. I have the most implicit confidence in every member of this jury. I have regarded your attention to the testimony in this case with the profoundest feelings of satisfaction. You have given the whole case such careful attention that I believe the result will be approved by all good citizens everywhere. It is one, as I said in opening, that has attracted unusual and great attention. I am not clamoring for a verdict against this defendant by reason of any passion or prejudice, or anything of that kind. She is entitled to a fair trial - she has had it. His honor has presided here with so much grace and dignity, and with such a conscientious discharge of his duties that it seems to me that no one can complain that Mrs. Bennett, if convicted, is not convicted after one of the most remarkable fair trials that ever occurred in the state of Iowa. I believe this jury will follow the path marked out in the deliberations of the court and counsel here. We have done our best on both sides, and conscientiously discharged our duty, and if the murderer of Anna Wiese is not discovered as a result of this trial you should reflect upon the condition of things after that, but you should not convict Mrs. Bennett on that account only. After you have looked all over the evidence, weighted it carefully and passed upon it beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find a verdict of such a grade of crime as you believe her guilty of, if you believe her guilty of any.
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